

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2519
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0110

EXDIS /SALT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 27, 1975.
(SALT TWO -584)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH 27, 1975.

QUOTE:

SEmenov Statement, March 27, 1975

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT REQUIREMENTS IN WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TEXT FOR THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMTN IS THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT BE EFFECTIVE AND VIABLE.

IT FOLLOWS FROM THE DISCUSSIONS AT THIS PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST REMAIN STABLE AND EFFECTIVE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE TERM TO BE COVERED BY THE DOCUMENT

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BEING PREPARED, V.E., UNTIL THE END OF 1985. THE FACT THAT

OUR POSITIONS ON THIS QUESTION ARE CLOSE TO EACH OTHER RESTS ON THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING ENSUING FROM THE ACCORD AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST BE A MAJOR STEP IN THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND IN CURBING THE RACE IN SUCH ARMS. IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT CONCULUSION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST SERVE TO LESSEN THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND TO STRENGTHEN THE FOUNDATIONS OF UNIVERSAL SECURITY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE WORK ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON WORD-ING FOR INCLUSION IN THE JOINT DRAFT IT IS NECESSARY TO USE ALL AVAILABLE POSSIBILITIES, SO THAT THE LIMITATIONS ESTAB-ISHED IN ALL THEIR TOTALITY MEET THE AFOREMENTIONED STAB-ILITY AND VIABILITY, WHICH ARE REQUIRED OF SUCH AN IMPORTANT INTERGOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENT AS THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING PRE-PARED IS CALLED UPON TO BECOME .

THE SOVIET DRAFT BEING CONSIDERED BY THE DELEGATIONS CONTAINS A WHOLE SERIES OF PROVISIONS AIMED AT ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATION MEASURES PROVIDED FOR THEREIN, AND ALSO AT INCREASING THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS THE USSR DELEGATION HAS PROVIDED DETAILED AND WELL-REASONED ARGUMENTS IN SUBSTANTIATION OF SEVERAL SUCH PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, AND THE U.S. SIDE IS AWARE OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS.

I

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. SIDE TO THE QUESTION OF AGREEING ON A PROVISION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE JOINT TEXT OF THE DRAFT DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT, WHICH IS AIMED AT PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THE NEW AGREEMENT THROUGH TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, OR THROUGH ASSISTANCE IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

YOU KNOW THAT THIS QUESTION HAS A HISTORY--IT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS BEGINNING IN 1969. AT VARIOUS STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY PRESENTED DETAILED RATIONALE AND PROPOSED THAT

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AN APPROPRIATE PROVISION BE AGREED UPON AND INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT.

THE NEED TO SEARCH FOR AN AGREED SOLUTION TO THIS ISSUE HAS ALSO BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE U.S. SIDE, IN PARTICULAR ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME THAN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE.

THUS, AT THE APRIL 12, 1973 MEETING, THE U.S. SIDE MADE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON NON-TRANSFER, AFTER AN UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC ARMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES WAS CONCRETELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY RESOLVED DURING PREPARATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS. IN ARTICLE IX OF THAT DOCUMENT THE SIDES, TO ASSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY, ASSUMED THE OBLIGATIONS NOT TO TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO DEPLOY OUTSIDE THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY, ABM SYSTEMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS LIMITED BY THE TERMS OF THE TREATY. IN ADDITION, IN THE AGREED STATEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972 THE SIDES NOTED THAT THEY PROCEED FROM THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ARTICLE IX OF THE TREATY INCLUDES AN UNDERTAKING BY THE USSR AND THE U.S. NOT TO PROVIDE TO OTHER STATES TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUE-PRINTS, SPECIALLY WORKED OUT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS LIMITED BY THE TREATY.

THESE PROVISIONS COMPRIZE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS, AND PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENHANCING ITS VIABILITY.

THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE, WHICH WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT PROVIDES FOR AN OBLIGATION NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AND NOT TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR BY TRANSFER OF COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THESE ARMS, IS FORMULATED IN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT.

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BEING BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT PREVIOUS PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TAKES FULL ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIFICS INVOLVED IN THE RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WITH RESPECT TO WORKING OUT LIMITATIONS FOR PRECISELY OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS.

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT INCLUSION OF THIS ARTICLE IN THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE FOR ENHANCING ITS STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS.

INDEED, IF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WERE TO REMAIN UNBLOCKED AND WERE TO BE USED, THIS WOULD LEAD TO CONSEQUENCES WHICH ARE CLEARLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES OR WITH THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING UNIVERSAL PEACE.

RETENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES COULD, REGARDLESS OF THE CALCULATIONS
OF THE SIDE THAT WOULD UNDERTAKE SUCH ACTIONS, RESULT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2520
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EXDIS/SALT

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IN ADDING TO POSSIBLE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS FOR THE OUTBREAK
OF NUCLEAR WAR. SUCH A POSSIBILITY COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION
IN WHICH FOR QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS ONE OF THE SIDES
WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES IN RESPONSE. IN OTHER
WORDS, A SITUATION WOULD ARISE WHICH WOULD, THROUGH THE BACK
DOOR, SO TO SPEAK, LEAD TO THE ACTION-REACTION CYCLE WHICH
BOTH SIDES HAVE OFTEN SAID WAS UNDESIRABLE AND DANGEROUS.

THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED WOULD ALSO FULLY APPLY TO THE
POSSIBILITY, IF SUCH POSSIBILITY WERE NOT PRECLUDED, OF TRANS-
FERRING TO OTHER STATES COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS FOR THESE ARMS.
A TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES OF SUCH COMPONENTS AND DOCUMENTATION
WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULD OBTAIN ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES
TO BUILD UP THEIR STRATEGIC POTENTIAL, WHICH DOES NOT SERVE
THE INTERESTS OF REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR AND COULD NOT BUT

BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE SIDES IN APPRAISING THE CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM IN TERMS OF SAFEGUARDING THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS.

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THEREFORE BOTH SIDES ARE INTERESTED IN HAVING THE NEW AGREEMENT PRECLUDE, IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS FORM, POSSIBILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN CONSEQUENCES THAT RADICALLY CONFLICT WITH THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

A POSITIVE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF NOT TRANSFERRING TO OTHER STATES STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND NOT ASSISTING IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE FOR QUANTITATIVE AS WELL AS QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IF ANY THIRD STATE COULD DEVELOP OR SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF ITS STRATEGIC ARMS, FOR EXAMPLE BY ACQUIRING FROM ONE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES MOST ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPONS OR THEIR COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS, THEN, BESIDES WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN MENTIONED, SUCH A SITUATION WOULD IN ESSENCE MEAN THAT THE QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE CIRCUMVENTED.

THE CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS ON NON-TRANSFER BY THE SIDES, RECORDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, BEING A BARRIER TO THE APREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING THE RELIABILITY OF THE MEASURES AGREED UPON BETWEEN OUR STATES FOR THE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL OR UNQUOTORIZED USE OF THESE WEAPONS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY NOT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, BUT IN A BROADER ASPECT AS WELL.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES NOT TO TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OR ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE OF A RECIPROCAL NATURE AND CONSEQUENTLY WOULD APPLY TO BOTH SIDES EQUALLY. IN THESE TERMS, THIS OBLIGATION WOULD BE OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE FOR CONSISTENTLY EMBODYING THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES IN THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985.

ACHIEVEMENT OF AN UNDERSTANDING IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT REGARDING NON-TRANSFER WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH
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THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WOULD IN ESSENCE CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE GENUINE MEASURES TO INCREASE ITS EFFECTIVENESS, IN WHICH, AS IS CLEAR FROM THE TEXT OF THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 24, 1974, BOTH SIDES ARE INTERESTED. A MUTUAL OBLIGATION ON NON-TRANSFER WOULD ACQUIRE SPECIAL POLITICAL RESONANCE IN TERMS OF THE EFFORTS BEING MADE BY STATES TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THAT IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT.

THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES ON NON-TRANSFER WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL REALITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME THE TASK OF SECURING A LASTING PEACE AND ALTOGETHER EXCLUDING WAR FROM THE LIFE OF SOCIETY COMES TO THE FORE AS A TASK OF PRIME IMPORTANCE. BY BEING RECORDED IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT UNDER PREPARATION, PRECLUSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS LOFTY GOAL.

THE USSR DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985 INCLUDE THE OBLIGATION NOT TO TRANSFER TO OTHER STATES STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND NOT TO ASSIST IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

AS HAS ALREADY BEEN NOTED HERE, SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS ON THIS SCORE ARE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE XII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT.

WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL PRESENT ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS QUESTION.

II

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION AND THE INTEREST SHOWN HERE BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD THOROUGHLY EXAMINED THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE U.S. CONCERNING LIMITATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT ON LAUNCHERS WITH MIRVED MISSILES.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALREADY ADDRESSED SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. DRAFT AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, WHICH RELATE TO THIS ISSUE.

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IN ADDITION, TODAY WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. SIDE TO THE FOLLOWING.

ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 7, OF THE U.S. DRAFT PROVIDES THAT

FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT A MIRVED
BALLISTIC MISSILE IS ANY BALLISTIC MISSILE WITH A BOOSTER
WHICH IS OF A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT TESTED ONE OR MORE
TIMES WITH A MIRV SYSTEM. WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTER OF COUNTING
SLBM LAUNCHERS AND LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WITH MIRVED MIS-
SILES WITHIN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER (1,320) BEING ESTABLISHED,
THE USE OF THE CRITERION OF "A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT TESTED"
WOULD LEAD TO MAKING JUDGMENTS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES
WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE ACTUAL STATE
OF THINGS IN THE CORRESPONDING FIELD, BUT ON THE BASIS OF
ARBITRARY NOTIONS, FOR A BOOSTER OF ONE AND THE SAME TYPE CAN
BE TESTED AND DEPLOYED ON ITS CORRESPONDING LAUNCHER BOTH WITH
MIRVS AND WITHOUT THEM.

MOREOVER, AS FOLLOWS FROM ARTICLE IV, PARAGRAPH 3, OF THE
U.S. DRAFT, THE OPERATION UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT OF THE PROVI-
SIONS WHICH CONCERN LIMITATIONS ON LAUNCHERS WITH MIRVED
MISSILES, IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL IS MADE DIRECTLY DEPENDENT
ON THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE PROTOCOL TO THE U.S. DRAFT.

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EXDIS/SALT

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AT THE MEETINGS ON MARCH 21 AND 25, THE USSR DELEGATION

NOTED THAT THE WORDING OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH CONCERNS COUNTING WITHIN THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION OF 1,32000 UNITS FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHICH WAS STARTED AFTER JULY 1, 1970, AS WELL AS SLBM LAUNCHERS ON ALL SUBMARINES OF A GIVEN CLASS IF A MISSILE EQUIPPED WITH A MIRVED SYSTEM HAS BEEN DEPLOYED ON AN SLBM LAUNCHER ON ANY SUBMARINE OF THE SAME CLASS, IF SUCH PROVISIONS WERE INCLUDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT, WOULD LEAD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING AMONG THE LAUNCHERS BEING LIMITED BY THE AFOREMENTIONED AGGREGATE NUMBER, LAUNCHERS WITH MIRVED MISSILES, AS WELL AS THOSE WITH MISSILES NOT SO EQUIPPED.

ALSO, THE PROVISION, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH IS CONTAINED IN THE PROTOCOL, TO COUNT IN THE PERMITTED MAXIMUM LEVEL OF 1,320 UNITS LAUNCHERS CONVERTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PERMIT THE DEPLOYMENT ON THEM OF MIRVED MISSILES, WOULD LEAD TO THE SAME THING. AND IN THIS CASE, TOO, THE CRITERION FOR INCLUDING A LAUNCHER IN THE NUMBER BEING LIMITED WOULD NOT BE THE OBJECTIVE FACT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF A MIRVED MISSILE ON SUCH A LAUNCHER,

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BUT RATHER SOME ARBITRARY NOTIONS.

THE CONSIDERATION EXPRESSED, ALLEGING THAT THESE PROVISIONS ARE USEFUL FOR ENSURING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED AS WELL-FOUNDED. TAKEN IN THEIR TOTALITY, AND INDIVIDUALLY, THEY ARE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE SIDES CONCERNING FREEDOM TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THE SYSTEMS BEING LIMITED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OVERALL LIMITS BEING ESTABLISHED, AND ALSO CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO MODERNIZE AND REPLACE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN ESSENCE SUCH PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. DRAFT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ARE CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN PARAGRAPH 2, SUBPARAGRAPHS B AND C, AND PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, BY WHICH WE ARE TO BE GUIDED.

IF THE APPROACH SET FORTH IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE U.S. DRAFT REPRESENTS, AS HAS BEEN SAID HERE, AN ATTEMPT TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTIONS IT DEALS WITH, THEN ONE CANNOT BUT CONSIDER SUCH AN ATTEMPT COMPLETELY UNSUCCESSFUL, SINCE IT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR STATES. THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PROTOCOL ARE ONE-SIDED, SUBJECTIVE, AND IN ESSENCE ARE AIMED AT OBTAINING ADVANTAGES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT A REALISTIC

APPROACH IS NECESSARY, AND A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES, OF THE QUESTIONS BEING DISCUSSED, SOLUTIONS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF A COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT FOR THESE INTERESTS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.

AS FOR THE APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO THE PROBLEM OF ENSURING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED, THE U.S. SIDE IS WELL AWARE OF IT. IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE USSR DELEGATION HAS SHOWN IN A WELL-FOUNDED MANNER THAT THE OBLIGATIONS ENSUING FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-

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MEMOIRE, WHICH ARE SET FORTH IN THE SOVIET DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, ARE FULLY VERIFIABLE, IN THEIR ENTIRETY, BY THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SIDES. FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, NO ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF LIMITATION OR DEFINITIONS ARE REQUIRED.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE EXISTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES, REFLECTED IN THE COINCIDING PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XV OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AND ARTICLE X OF THE U.S. DRAFT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS FORMULATED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT, ENSURES RELIABLE VERIFICATIONS OF COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

III

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 7, AND ARTICLE IV, PARAGRAPH 3, OF THE U.S. DRAFT, AS WELL AS THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THIS CONNECTION IN THE DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE U.S. DRAFT, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING AND ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

IV

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN ITS STATEMENT AT THE MARCH 25 MEETING THE U.S. DELEGATION TOUCHED ON ARTICLE XIV OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AND ARTICLE VI OF THE U.S. DRAFT. IN OUR VIEW, THE SIMILARITY OF THE WORDING CONTAINED IN THESE ARTICLES MAKES IT QUITE POSSIBLE RIGHT NOW FOR THE KARPOV-KLOSSON GROUP TO TAKE UP THE DRAFTING OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS ON THE CORRESPONDING ISSUES FOR THE

PURPOSE OF PRESENTING THEM TO THE DELEGATIONS.

I BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE TASK
BEFORE US OF AGREEING ON A JOINT TEXT FOR THE DRAFT OF THE NEW
AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE IS PREPARED JOINTLY TO SEEK MUTUALLY
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ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE IN WORKING
OUT THE JOINT DRAFT AND THIS, OF COURSE, NOT AT THE EXPENSE
OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EITH SIDE. WE PROCEED FROM
THE PREMISE THAT THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, SUBSCRIBES TO THE SAME
APPROACH.

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